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ANTITRUST
DECISIONS CONCERNING
SUPPLIER-DEALER RELATIONS AND
THE RULE OF REASON
LAWRENCE

H.

EIGER*

The most significant decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the 1980-81 term reflect the development of legal theory
in two areas of antitrust law: supplier-dealer relations and the rule of
reason.
SUPPLIER-DEALER RELATIONS

Dealer Terminations
Dealer terminations might well be the largest single source of antitrust litigation in the universe of business conduct. However, the popularity of such litigation ought not to be taken as indicating that
plaintiffs are successful litigants, since courts generally do not look
kindly upon terminated dealer antitrust plaintiffs.
Judicial review begins with the premise established in United
States v. Colgate & Co. I that a supplier may choose with whom he will
deal, even if the supplier has agreed with a competitor of the dealer to
replace him, and even if losing his source of supply injures or destroys
the dealer. 2 The supplier's right of refusal is not, however, unlimited.
If a dealer is cut off pursuant to an anticompetitive conspiracy involving the supplier or for purposes of gaining monopoly or market control
for the supplier, the termination may violate section 1 of the Sherman
3
Act.
* Partner, Much, Shelist, Freed, Denenberg, Ament & Eiger, P.C., Chicago, Illinois. B.A.,
University of Michigan; J.D., University of Chicago.
1. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
2. Ark Dental Supply Co. v. Cavitron Corp., 461 F.2d 1093, 1094 (3d Cir. 1972) (per
curiam). The Third Circuit stated:
[Ilt is indisputable that a single manufacturer or seller can ordinarily stop doing business
with A and transfer his business to B and that such a transfer is valid even though B may
have solicited the transfer and even though the seller and B may have agreed prior to the
seller's termination of A.
Id. See aLro Burdett Sound Inc. v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1975); Bushie v. Stenocord
Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972); Ace Beer Distributors, Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th
Cir.), ceri. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 1 of the Act now provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
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There are two criteria for violation of the statute in a dealer termination case.4 First, the termination must be the product of an agreement, as opposed to a unilateral decision by the supplier acting on its
own, not to do business with the dealer. Secondly, the termination
must adversely affect competition. If the termination is part and parcel
of aperse violation, such as price fixing, the termination itself may be
considered unlawful. If, however, the supplier's action does not fall
within theper se categories, the adverse impact on competition must be
proved under the rule of reason. Generally, courts have declined to
find the requisite adverse impact where a supplier merely substitutes
5
one dealer for another.
In its recent term, the Seventh Circuit had before it two dealer
termination cases. The opinions in these cases broke no new ground
because the evidence did not require any major expansion of the case
law. In one decision, the dealer plaintiffs claims were sustained because it was terminated as part of a price fixing agreement with plaintiff's competitors, aper se violation of section 1. In the other decision,
the court affirmed the dismissal of a dealer plaintiff who could show no
adverse impact on competition nor any elements of a conspiracy in a
non per se case.
Trabert& Hoeffer, Inc. v. Piaget Watch Corp.6 represented the Sev-

enth Circuit's first opportunity to consider a dealer termination in the
context of a resale price maintenance case. The court reaffirmed the
rule that vertical price fixing conspiracies are indeedper se unlawful.
Although the court's ruling did not make new law, it is important in the
current climate which finds the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division declaring a "new" antitrust philosophy, which
7
apparently sees no evil in vertical price fixing.

The fact situation in Trabert & Hoeffer was an antitrust classic. A
dared to be illegal Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See, e.g., Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080,
1085 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
4. See, e.g., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 133-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 946 (1978); Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 469-70 (8th Cir.

1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
5. See, e.g., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 133 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 946 (1978).
6. 633 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
7. E.g., Meadows, Bold Departures in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Oct. 5, 1981, at 180.
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discounting retailer refused to change his ways. Competing retailers
then complained to the manufacturer, who agreed to and did cut off the
discounting dealer. The evidence showed that Schilling, Piaget's sales
representative, not only urged plaintiff's president to restrict his discounting to twenty percent, but he also "explained that his warning was
a response to complaints from other retailers." Thereafter, when the
plaintiff repudiated a brief pricing agreement with Piaget, Schilling answered competing retailers' pleas for protection "with a commitment to
'firm up the market.'" Schilling also expressly agreed with another
competing retailer that the retailer would limit its discounting if Piaget
enforced a similar limited discount policy. Piaget began to curtail the
plaintiff's supply of watches without explanation, but Schilling finally
told the plaintiff's president that the plaintiff had been terminated "beand [his] refusal to adhere
cause of pressure from plaintiff's competitors
0
to the 20% maximum discount."'
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of a Sherman Act violation, stating:
[Tjhis case involves a history of explicit threats and agreements by
the defendants to restrain pnce competition coupled with an unsatisfactorily explained refusal to deal. While the law recognizes that a
manufacturer has a right to sell to whom it pleases, this court has
held this right to be neither absolute nor exempt from regulation. "If
it is accompanied by unlawful conduct or agreement, or conceived in
monopolistic purpose or market control, the right is deemed to have
transgressed the (Sherman] Act."" 1
The clarity of the evidence in Trabert & Hoeffer, and the almost
incredible lack of subtlety on the part of Piaget's sales representative in
explaining to the plaintiff exactly why it was being terminated, may
have been a mixed blessing. Direct evidence of conspiracy in a dealer
termination case is a rarity. However, in distinguishing opinions cited
by defendants, the court of appeals appears to suggest that evidence
less clear cut than a defendant's unequivocal admissions and promises
that he would rid plaintiff's competitors of the price cutter would be
insufficient to sustain a violation of section 1. For example, the defendants cited Borger v. Yamaha InternationalCorp., 12 in which the Second

Circuit held that a manufacturer's consultation with a plaintiff's prospective competitors before declining to offer the plaintiff a franchise
8. 633 F.2d at 480.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 633 F.2d at 481 (citing Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080,
1085 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971)).
12. 625 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980).
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254

did not establish a boycott. Distinguishing Borger, the Seventh Circuit
noted:
The district court here, acting consistently with the Borger caveat,
based its liability finding on evidence of explicit agreements, beyond
mere consultation and complaint-hearing, between defendants and
plaintifrs competitors to effect the proven restraint, Le., priceing.13

Similarly, in distinguishing Klein Y. American Luggage Works,
Inc.,' 4 the court noted that the evidence in that case did not show complaints were directed at the plaintiff in particular, whereas the record
before the court showed that the complaints of competing retailers were
specifically directed at Trabert & Hoeffer's practices and were the basis
of the defendant's decision.
While the court acknowledged that direct evidence of agreement
need not be shown, the court's choice of grounds on which to distinguish Borger and Klein reflect at least an ambivalence in the opinion. Courts have long recognized that although antitrust conspiracies
are often not susceptible to proof by direct evidence, their existence
may be inferred from the actions of the parties.' 5 If competitors of a
price-cutting dealer complain to the supplier, about either the discounter specifically or price-cutting in general, and if the supplier, after
"complaint hearing" and "consultation," terminates the price-cutter, a
jury should be permitted to infer a conspiracy to end the discounting
16
retailer's career.
Courts should not expect that a supplier, like Piaget in Trabert &
Hoeffer, will provide the terminated dealer with direct evidence of an
explicit agreement between the supplier and the plaintiff's competitors
which is specifically aimed at the plaintiff. For example, if the supplier
is reasonably sophisticated, it will establish contemporaneously with
the price-cutter's termination a new "marketing plan" which never
mentions price, but nonetheless gives the supplier a business reason for
eliminating the offender. Direct evidence of the type found in Trabert
& Hoeffer should not be required to prove that a supplier's termination
of a price-cutter was not unilateral. Courts have consistently found unlawful those dealer terminations which have been motivated by price
13. 633 F.2d at 481 n.1 (emphasis added).
14. 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).

15. See Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939).
16. The Seventh Circuit distinguished Borger on grounds that there was no evidence of "anything like price-fixing" and that the "complaint hearing" and "consultation" occurred in the context of a supplier's decision whether to add plaintiff as a dealer, not in cutting off an existing
distributor. 633 F.2d at 481 n.i. See Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 395, 397 (2d
Cir. 1980).
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maintenance purposes. 17 This position will be substantially weakened
if the Seventh Circuit follows through on its apparent inclination to
limit the practical inferences which can be reasonably drawn from the
conduct of the parties in such cases.
The dealer's termination in ContractorUtility Sales Co. v. CertainTeed Products Corp.'8 lacked the price fixing elements of Trabert &

Hoeffer and thus fell outside theper se rule applied in that case. Plaintiff CUSCO was a distributor of PVC plastic pipe manufactured by
Certain-Teed. In 1976, Certain-Teed cancelled its "agency" agreements with distributors and offered them less lucrative distribution
agreements which the plaintiff refused to accept. At various times, Certain-Teed offered other distributors better pricing in bidding on jobs.
The parties' rocky relations came to an end in 1977 when Certain-Teed
terminated the plaintiff as a distributor.
At the outset, the Seventh Circuit drew the line of demarcation
between refusals to deal resulting from conduct which isper se illegal
and those refusals to deal which may be completely proper under the
rule of reason. CUSCO alleged that Certain-Teed had conspired with
the former's competitors to eliminate it from the market. The court
found, however, that CUSCO had not established aprimafacie case of
conspiracy between the manufacturer and other distributors to eliminate it as a competitor. Rather, the evidence was that of a unilateral
action by Certain-Teed, which regardless of its anticompetitive effects,
is not prohibited by section 1.19
Thus, lacking the factual basis for aper se violation, CUSCO was
required under the rule of reason to prove competitive injury in the
market. The court noted that the plaintiff had presented some evidence
concerning price, but held that the facts simply did not fit the pricefixing mold. While Certain-Teed had engaged in some discriminatory
pricing on bid jobs and had granted a competitor terms not offered
CUSCO, this did not in itself show either price discrimination or an
anticompetitive effect in the PVC pipe market. 20
Again, no new trails were blazed, but then the facts of the case did
not require or even suggest drastic departures from established precedent. Trabert& Hoeffer and ContractorUtility are, if nothing else, object lessons for any terminated dealer contemplating antitrust litigation
17. See Alloy Int'l Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222, 1225-26 (7th Cir. 1980)
(citing Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 170 (3d Cir. 1979)).
18. 638 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1981).
19. Id. at 1075.
20. Id. at 1075-76.
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against his former supplier. They set out the guidelines and borders
which previously had not been so clearly marked by the courts.
Coercion In Supplier-Dealer Relationships
The disparity in the economic power between suppliers and their
dealers has long been the subject of both decisions and commentary.
Over the years, courts have become increasingly aware that in certain
industries a manufacturer can coerce its dealers to do its will without
2
overt actions or threats of action. '
In 1964, the Seventh Circuit first considered this issue in Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.22 In Tire Sales Corp.
v. Cities Service Oil Co ,23 the Seventh Circuit again examined evidence
of dealer coercion and, with a pragmatic view of business realities in
the oil industry, concluded that the evidence was sufficient to warrant
submission of the case to the jury. The plaintiff, a tire wholesaler, was
terminated by an oil company whose dealers bought tires from the
plaintiff. The circumstances of the plaintiff's termination itself were
not at issue in the case. However, the plaintiff alleged that, after cancelling its agreement with the plaintiff, the defendant coerced its dealers into purchasing tires solely from another wholesaler to the
exclusion of the plaintiff.
The Seventh Circuit took note of the plaintiff's direct evidence of
demands and threats to the dealers by the defendant's sales representatives. However, the court also noted that overt acts of coercion were
not the only means of enforcing a tying arrangement. It stated that
circumstantial evidence, such as the course of dealing between the oil
company and its dealers and the speed with which the company's
wishes were translated into dealer acquiescence, would be sufficient to
establish such coercion. The court recognized that the economic power
inherent in the dealers' dependence on the oil company for their livelihood could make a "recommendation. . . tantamount to command." 24
21. See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 226-29 (1968); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381
U.S. 357, 368 (1965). See also Comments by A. Silberman & L. Abrams, Limits of Controlin a
Franchiing System" Drawing the Lives, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1719, 1722, 1726 (1979) (panel
discussion).
22.- 331 F.2d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 1964), affdsub nom. Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S.
357 (1965).
23. 637 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981).

24. Id. at 473 (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 1964),
aff'dsub nom. Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965)).

The Seventh Circuit in Tire

Sales summarized at length and quoted from the testimony of dealers to demonstrate the subtle
yet real economic pressure which deterred them from purchasing tires from the plaintiff. One
dealer, while admitting that Citgo had not expressly threatened his lease, said "I don't have to be
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Similarly, the court stated that the threat of lease cancellation, even if
not carried out, would be considered coercive for purposes of section 1
25
of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act.
Tire Sales is consistent with established precedent and is a healthy
reaffirmation of the Seventh Circuit's willingness to recognize the unspoken, but significant economic pressures which govern many supplier-dealer relationships.
REQUIREMENTS AND APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF REASON

Basic Requirements of the Rule of Reason
In common parlance, the term "restraint of trade" for purposes of
section 1 means the restraint or elimination of competition. The statute
is not read literally; all commercial transactions restrain trade to some
extent, but the law prohibits only those actions which unreasonably restrain trade. 26 Certain types of business conduct are invariably detrimental to competition and are therefore considered per se unlawful.
These include price fixing, customer and territorial allocations, tying
agreements and boycotts. 27 Horizontal agreements, i e., those which restrain competition between firms at the same level of economic activity,
are almost always considered per se unlawful. 28 Similarly, as previously noted, vertical agreements which fix or maintain prices are also
told certain things." Another testified on cross examination that "they didn't put a gun to my
head," but he stopped buying tires from the plaintiff because "you had to lean towards them
[Citgo] or otherwise they could have made it rough." 637 F.2d at 472 n.6.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). Section 14 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use,
consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District
of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United
States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on
the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities
of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale,
or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
26. E.g., Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 166 (3d Cir. 1979). See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933); Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
27. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (boycotts);
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (reciprocal dealing); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangement); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing).
28. Eg., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 827, 830 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930
(1979).
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consideredperse violations. 2 9
The problem of defining the circumstances in which a restraint,
which is notperse unlawful, may become unreasonable under section 1
has long defied easy solution. Some business practices may restrict
competition in one area but increase it in another. Some practices may
cause only a marginal lessening of competition as an incident to otherwise lawful business activity. On the other hand, a conspiracy to eliminate a competitor or restrict territories even for nonprice motives can
30
unreasonably alter the competitive balance in the marketplace.
In an attempt to establish a flexible framework for analyzing the
almost infinite variety of possible non per se restraints in an equally
infinite variety of possible market contexts, the United States Supreme
Court, in Chicago Boardof Trade v. United States,3 1 formulated what
has come to be known as the rule of reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question, the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
efore and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be obtained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
32 help
of intent may
regulation or the reverse; but because
predict consequences.
to knowledge
the court to interpret the facts and
Chicago Board of Trade is widely recognized as laying the traditional foundation for rule of reason analysis, but in application, the
reasonableness of a restraint-like beauty--seems to be in the eyes of
the beholder. The decisions under the rule of reason are at best a
mixed bag, combining the peculiarities of the facts addressed and the
courts' own predilections.
At the threshhold of the rule of reason is the requirement that the
relevant market be defined for purposes of evaluating the competitive
impact of the alleged restraint. 33 The relevant market concept encompasses both geographic area and product or product line. Antitrust
29. E.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,47 (1960); United States v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 720-24 (1944); Joe Regueira, Inc. v. American Distilling Co.,
642 F.2d 826, 832 (5th Cir. 1981).
30. See, e.g., Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068, 1076 (2d Cir. 1980).
31. 246 U.S. 231 (1948).
32. Id. at 238.
33. See, e.g., Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 385-86 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 440

U.S. 936 (1979).
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case law abounds with opinions defining the relevant market and, while
the parameters of a particular market will vary with the evidence and
the product at issue, the basic analytical structure for making the determination is now well-established. In economic terms, the relevant market is generally defined by reference to the cross-elasticity of supply or
demand for the product in the affected geographic area. 34 On a more
practical business level, the relevant market should embrace "areas of
effective competition and

. . .

the realities of competitive practice." 35

The second inquiry under the rule of reason deals with the consequences of the challenged practice to competition in the defined market. 36 If the restraint affects a de minimis amount of commerce, the
restraiat will not be deemed unreasonable. 37 Beyond such situations,
however, rule of reason analysis requires an examination of the particulars listed in Chicago Boardof Trade as they appear from the evidence
regarding the nature of the restraint and the status of competition both
before and after the conduct in question. The analysis of evidence
showing adverse impact on competition is occasionally quantitative.
In the thirty-one years since Chicago Boardof Trade, the Seventh
Circuit has had few occasions to consider the application of the rule of
reason. 3 8 In the past term, however, the court issued two decisions analyzing non per se restraints under the rule. Both decisions are somewhat unique in that they involved alleged conspiracies to exclude
competitors from the market. In contrast, most of the recent decisions
invoking the rule of reason have dealt with either dealer terminations
for nonprice reasons or the efficacy of vertically imposed territorial restraints, following the Supreme Court decision in ContinentalT V., Inc.
34. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324-25 (1962) (defining the market
for purposes of a section 7 violation of the Clayton Act). Cf.Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v.
Ventron Corp., [1976-21 Trade Cases (CCH) 61,146 (N.D. Il.1976), afld in part, vacated and
remanded in part, 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977), afg after remand, 570 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978) (dealing with the relevant market under section 2 of the Sherman
Act). See also L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 374-76 (1978).

35. L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1971). See also Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 709-10 (7th Cir. 1977), aft'g after remand, 570 F.2d 347
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303, 307-09
(7th Cir. 1976).
36. E.g., American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, (3d Cir. 1975).
37. E.g., Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 916 (1979).
38. See Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 916 (1979); General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery, 568 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978);
Lee Klinger Volkswagen, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 583 F.2d 910 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1004 (1978); Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.denied, 440 U.S.
982 (1979).
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v. GTE-Sylvania, Inc.39 It is possible to discern a trend toward a narrower view of the rule from the Seventh Circuit's ruling for defendants
in both cases. The outcome of the cases, however, is less significant
than the principles enunciated by the court.
The Recent Decisions
In Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wisconsin National Bank,4° the
plaintiff, a developer, owned a two-building commercial real estate
project in the Milwaukee central business district ("CBD"), next to
land owned by the defendant, First Wisconsin Bank. Notwithstanding
its financial difficulties, which included defaults on the first and second
mortgages covering its two office buildings, the plaintiff decided to
build a third structure which would be the largest building on the property. It then undertook an extensive search to secure financing. The
planned office tower would have added 300,000 square feet of space to
the CBD. First Wisconsin also had plans for a large office building
which would have placed approximately one million additional square
feet of space in the CBD one year after the scheduled completion of the
plaintiff's tower. The CBD, however, could absorb only 200,000 square
4
feet of space annually. '
The plot thickened with evidence showing that the plaintiff was a
customer of First Wisconsin, which had accumulated a credit file on
Juneau Square. Also, both First Wisconsin and Marshall-Michigan, a
part owner of Juneau Square and second mortgagee on the project,
were clients of the same Milwaukee law firm. The plaintiffs efforts to
secure funding failed and its financial situation worsened. 42 Marshall39. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (holding that nonprice vertical restraints are notper se violations of
the Sherman Act and should be determined under the rule of reason).
40. 624 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1013 (1980).
41. Id. at 801-02. Although First Wisconsin had purchased an additional adjacent parcel
from an insurance company which had also planned to build yet another office building, First
Wisconsin still "faced significant potential competition from East [plaintiff's proposed building]."
East offered earlier occupancy and a more desirable location with an unobstructed view of Lake
Michigan. Id. at 802 n.l.
42. Id. at 802-05. The evidence showed that, while the plaintiff was attempting to secure
financing from Aetna, an official of First Wisconsin examined the Juneau Square credit file and
discussed acquiring the project with an attorney at its Milwaukee firm. The attorney then sent a
letter to a Chicago attorney instructing him to explore whether Aetna would sell its first mortgage.
The Milwaukee attorney's direction contained confidential information from the credit file. Aetna
rejected the plaintiff's financing proposal before the visit from First Wisconsin's Chicago attorney,
whose mission was also unsuccessful

The plaintiff then turned without success to Metropolitan Life after the latter was told by
another First Wisconsin employee of the plaintiffs financial difficulties and its default on the
mortgages. Thereafter, a representative of Marshall-Michigan met an official of First Wisconsin
in the office of their common counsel and explored First Wisconsin's interest in acquiring Marshall-Michigan's interest in Juneau Square. Other attempts to secure financing proved similarly
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Michigan ultimately foreclosed on its second mortgage, reached agreement with the first mortgagee and sold its interest to Marshall-Wisconsin, a First Wisconsin subsidiary, thus giving the latter complete control
of Juneau Square. The plaintiff sued, alleging a violation of section 1
because its attempts to secure additional financing had been thwarted
by a conspiracy involving First Wisconsin.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on its claim under section 1, finding that the defendants had conspired to restrain trade unreasonably "in the leasing, development, construction and financing of
rental office space in the Milwaukee CBD. ' '4 3 The district court, however, ordered a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the
weight, of the evidence, that the damages awarded by the jury were
excessive and that prejudicial errors had been committed by both the
court and the plaintiff's counsel."4 The second trial resulted in a verdict
for all the defendants on all issues.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court had
not abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. In so doing, the court
also approved the following instruction concerning the rule of reason:
The term "restraint of trade" . . . contemplates only an unreasonable restraint of trade. The law recognizes that it may be impossible to conduct a business without in some degree restraining trade.
The antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of competition, not
competitors. The plaintiffs must, therefore, establish that the defendants' acts injured not only the plaintiffs themselves, but competition
The plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this case by showing
concerted activities of the defendants restrained interstate commerce
to some degree, they must show that there was an unreasonablerestraint. A restraint is unreasonable !fit tends or is reasonably calculated to prejudice the public interest. . . . [T~he plaintiff may not
recover unless you find an unreasonable restraint by4 5 a preponderance of the evidence as defined in these instructions.
The court noted that the approved instruction was designed specifically
to inform the jury that the plaintiff could meet its burden of showing
public injury by proving that the defendants' conduct tended to or was
reasonably calculated to prejudice the public interest. The court's next
observations, however, appear to blur the instruction's language.
unsuccessful after the prospective financiers spoke with First Wisconsin and examined its credit
file on Juneau Square. Id.
43. Id. at 805. See Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank, 435 F. Supp. 1307,
1321 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
44. Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank, 435 F. Supp. 1307, 1321 (E.D. Wis.
1977).

45. 624 F.2d at 810 (emphasis in original).
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The court first observed that the distinction between a restraint of
trade and a business tort is "an adverse effect upon competition, however small."' 46 In the same paragraph, however, the court appeared to
contradict itself, saying that "plaintiffs must show also that the 'effect
upon competition in the marketplace is substantially adverse.' "47 The
court did not elaborate on this statement, but rather, reversed course
again. It noted that, absent another approved instruction, the jury
might have believed it could award damages based on conduct "that
had no impact on the relevant market merely because plaintiffs and
defendants were competitors .... ,,4" In the context of the court's earlier statements, the logical converse of the phrase "no impact" would
seem to be that "some" impact would suffice under the rule of reason.
Given these apparently contradictory statements, an analysis of
the competitive impact evidence might have provided a better indication of the court's thinking. However, the court was not presented with
the question of whether the plaintiff had in fact proved a cognizable
effect upon competition; hence, no such analysis was warranted.
The Seventh Circuit's other decision, Havoco of America Ltd v.
Shell Oil Co.,49 decided seven days after Juneau Square, similarly afforded the court no opportunity to clarify its position on the nature and
extent of competitive impact evidence that is required. In Havoco, the
court set out the rationale and historical premises of the rule of reason
which emphasizes not the reasonableness of the conduct itself but
rather the reasonableness of the conduct's effect on competition:
The Rule does not exempt restraints which may be argued to be reasonable or expedient, but rather focuses on the reasonableness of the
effect of the challenged restraint on competition. . . . An examination of the legality of any conduct alleged to be anticompetitive
therefore necessitates a determination as to what
5 0 the consequences of
the conduct have been in the affected market.
The court held that the plaintiff's failure to even allege injury to competition in the relevant market was grounds for dismissal of the complaint. Again, as in Juneau Square, the opportunity to relate theory to
evidence did not present itself. Since the case was before the Seventh
Circuit on the pleadings, there was no occasion for the court to deter46. Id.
47. Id. at 811 (citing United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled
sub nom. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE-Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)); Magnus Petroleum
Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 916 (1979); Lee Klinger
Volkswagen, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 583 F.2d 910 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978).
48. 624 F.2d at 811.
49. 626 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1980).

50. Id. at 554 (citation omitted).
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mine what evidence would satisfy the requirement of showing an ad-

verse impact on competition.
The earlier decisions of the Seventh Circuit give few clues as to the
development of the court's thinking on the evidentiary requirements of
the rule of reason. Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skell Oil Co. 51 involved a
de minimis quantum of commerce. In Lee Klinger Volkswagen, Inc. v.
Chrysler Corp ,52 a former Dodge dealer sued the automobile manufacturer alleging that the latter's operation of a nearby competing Dodge
dealership at a loss violated section 1. The plaintiff conceded that
Chrysler did not intend to injure it and did not allege predatory pricing
by the competing dealership. Plaintiff remained profitable until it terminated its Dodge dealership to become a Volkswagen dealer. The
court observed that, while the plaintitis withdrawal left one less independent Dodge dealer in the Chicago metropolitan area, the evidence showed that thereafter two company-operated dealerships were
sold to independent dealer investors. Thus, the court found no adverse
impact on competition.
The Rule of Reason and Unfair Competition
The antitrust law and the common law tort of unfair competition
have developed an uneasy relationship over the years. Because the fact
patterns associated with both bodies of law are quite similar, the issue
of whether acts of unfair competition also constitute antitrust violations
often arises.
Early decisions in the First Circuit beginning with Albert PickBarth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp.5 3 concluded that conspiracy to
destroy or injure a competitor by unfair competitive methods constituted aper se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Tenth
Circuit endorsed thisperse approach in Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distributing Co.5* The strength of these decisions, however, has
been gradually eroded, even in the First Circuit."5 In place of theper se
51. 599 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 916 (1979). In MagnusPetroleum, Magnus,
a terminated dealer, charged the defendant with a tying arrangement in violation of section 3 of
the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 14 (1976). The plaintiff dealer
accounted for less than one percent of the gasoline sales in a thirteen county area surrounding
Sheboygan, Wisconsin and the court found that any foreclosure of competition as a result of the
termination was de minimis. Id. at 204.
52. 583 F.2d 910 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978).
53. 57 F.2d 96 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 552 (1932). See also Atlantic Heel Co. v.
Allied Heel Co., 284 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1960).
54. 353 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 945 (1966).
55. See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975) (limiting Pick-Barth and Atlantic Heel to their facts).
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treatment suggested by the Pick-Barth line of cases, recent decisions in
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have analyzed unfair methods of compe56
tition which injure or destroy a competitor under the rule of reason.
In Juneau Square and Havoco, the Seventh Circuit joined the trend,
holding that acts of unfair competition should not be consideredper se
violations of section 1. The court in both opinions expressly rejected
the Pick-Barth line of decisions, citing what it described as the trend
toward narrowing the classes of conduct consideredper se violations of
the Act.
In Juneau Square, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's
refusal to give aperse jury instruction, noting that "unfair methods" is
too vague a concept to warrantper se treatment. In holding that such
conduct must be judged under rule of reason standards, the court
stated:
In view of the variety of practices-and resulting economic effectsthat conceivably may be characterized as unfair methods of competition, . . .the determination whether a practice or practices challenged solely on this basis is cognizable under the Sherman Act is
better left to the more particularized consideration possible under the
rule of reason.
We fully concur with Judge Roney's observation in Northwest
Power Products, 576 F.2d at 90, that "the line drawn by the PickBarth doctrine is so vague, and the circumstances in which its application manifests any injury to competition so dependent on individual facts that it does' 57not merit theper se characterization some of the

early cases give

it."

The court did not analyze the Juneau Square facts under the rule of
reason since the only issue before it concerned the efficacy of the
rejectedper se jury instruction.
The Havoco court, like the Juneau Square panel, quoted Northwest
Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Industries, Inc., 5s with approval and
adopted its reasoning that the vagueness of unfair competition was
such that it could not serve as a guideline for business conduct and thus
did not warrantper se treatment.5 9 The Havoco panel, however, went
well beyond the earlier holding in Juneau Square. The court quoted
the Northwest Power Products opinion to the effect that "unfair compe56. See Northwest Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 578 F.2d 1256
(8th Cir. 1978).
57. 624 F.2d at 812-13.
58. 576 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1978).

59. 626 F.2d at 556. Although the Juneau Square and Havoco decisions were issued only
seven days apart and Judge Wood sat on both panels, the Havoco court took no note of the
decision in Juneau Square.
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tition is still competition" and that the common law business tort and
the antitrust laws serve conflicting purposes because the antitrust laws
seek to remove restraints on competition while "the law of unfair competition tends to protect a business in the monopoly over [its customers]
60

In Northwest Power, the Fifth Circuit perceived a previously unrecognized conflict between antitrust and unfair competition. It also
imposed the totally new requirement that, to be cognizable, the negative impact on market competition from unfair conduct must be greater
than the increase in market share a defendant could legitimately obtain
through a merger. 61 The Fifth Circuit cited no authority for its unique
corollary to the rule of reason.
The conflict between antitrust and unfair competition perceived by
the Fifth Circuit, and adopted without further explanation by the Seventh Circuit, is conjectural at best. Not all acts of unfair competition
have a competitive impact. However, unfair competition can be and
frequently is used to eliminate or cripple competition. 62 The objective
of the law of unfair competition is not, as the Fifth Circuit stated in
Northwest Power, preserving entrenched competitors, but rather
preventing a competitor from injuring another's business by acts which
violate accepted standards of commercial conduct.
Although, as the Fifth Circuit observed, unfair competition is not
susceptible to a bright line definition, neither is much of the conduct,
other than per se violations, which restrains trade under section 1.63
The types of conduct which can unreasonably restrain trade by unfairly
60. Id.

61. 576 F.2d at 88-89. The Northwest Power court first noted the conflict between the two

bodies of law by observing that the law of unfair competition tends to protect a business' monopoly over the loyalty of its employees and its customer lists, while the purpose of antitrust law is to
promote competition by freeing from monopoly a firm's sources of labor and markets for its products. Id. at 88. The court then stated:
First, absent some market impact comparable to that which would be forbidden by
the law of mergers, the interests protected by the antitrust laws never arise. . . . If a
defendant could achieve a desired result either by lawful merger or by engaging in unfair
competition, the choice of the unfair competition route alone should not give rise to an
antitrust violation.
Second, only if the defendant can gain an increment of monopoly through his unfair
competition would the additional sanctions of the Sherman Act, including treble damages and criminal sanctions, be appropriately used to deter him. Single damages or
equivalent injunctive relief is thought sufficient to compensate a firm for unfair
competition.
Id. at 89 (citations omitted). The court cited no authority for its unique reasoning which applies
the merger standards of section 7 of the Clayton Act and the monopolization criteria of section 2
of the Sherman Act to a restraint of trade. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 17 (1976).
62. See, e.g., Snyder v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ill.
1976).
63. 576 F.2d at 88.
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injuring a competitor are limited only by the imaginations of the business people involved. By the same token, the competitive impact of an
unfair preclusionary practice can be subtle but nonetheless significant
in the market. The Fifth Circuit's assumption that antitrust law and
the law of unfair competition are incompatible erects a barrier to analysis which is both unnecessary and functionally incorrect. Indeed, the
Havoco court acknowledged that
[e]very authority which has rejected the applicability of the per se
doctrine to acts of unfair competition has nevertheless recognized
that such conduct may be actionable under the antitrust laws if the
effect is to restrain free competition. An injury which results from
unfair competition may, in short, be an antitrust injury if the other
elements of the offense are present. 6 4
Having concluded that unfair competition can result in an antitrust violation if other antitrust elements are present, the Havoco court,
perhaps influenced by Northwest Power, added a new and unprecedented requirement which makes proof of negative competitive impact
under the rule of reason for unfair conduct all but impossible:
We think that the market power of the defendant, both before and
after the allegedly anticompetitive conduct is a particularly important factor. It is not the unfair means which may have been employed by the defendant that fall within the purview of the Sherman
Act. Rather, the sole question is whether those means lessened competition. As noted above, unfair competition is still competition, and
will be actionable under the antitrust laws generally only where a
defendant with substantial market power uses the unfair means to
increase its share of the market65by eliminating a competitor, thereby
creating the risk of monopoly.
The requirement that the defendant be shown to possess "substantial" market power before the allegedly anticompetitive conduct, and
that there be a risk of monopoly after, finds no support in precedent or
economic logic. Indeed, the Havoco panel cited no precedent for this
aspect of its decision. Requiring the plaintiff to show the extent of the
defendant's market power, both before and after the plaintiff's destruction, unduly restricts the application of section 1 to anticompetitive
practices. It is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court decisions in
Chicago Boardof Trade v. United States6 6 and NationalSociety of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States.67 Chicago Boardof Trade sets out
the elements of the required examination into the various aspects of the
64.
65.
66.
67.

626 F.2d at 556.
Id. at 558.
246 U.S. 231 (1948).
435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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alleged restraint and its market impact. 68 National Society similarly
emphasizes the competitive impact of the restraint. 69 But neither decision provides precedent or rationale for adding proof of a defendant's
market power as an element of unreasonable competitive injury.
Neither Havoco nor Northwest Power suggests any legal or economic rationale for singling out unfair competition for the imposition
of this additional requirement, other than the rubric that "unfair competition is still competition." Any act which excludes a competitor
from the market is, in a sense, competition. Carried to its logical extreme, competition by means of defamation, violence and coercion are
also "still competition." The type of exclusionary conduct should not
alter the nature of the evidence required under the rule of reason.
Practical litigating considerations also militate against imposing a
requirement that the defendant's market share be proved and be shown
to have increased to the level of risking monopoly. Market power is a
function of many factors, including time, product, brand limitations,
and geography, and may not be readily susceptible to empirical measurement. Market statistics are compiled for major industries, but for
smaller industries, service businesses and firms in various levels of distribution, such data may be unobtainable, except by expert testimony
or by collecting statistics from each firm in the market under subpoena.
The cost of antitrust litigation is already prohibitive for most small and
medium sized concerns; the Havoco and Northwest Power criteria compound the difficulty of obtaining antitrust remedies for such businesses.
Havoco erects new barriers to such access with yet another unprecedented requirement--that of evidence of an increase in the defendant's market power to the point of "creating a risk of monopoly." The
requirement that the restraint be sufficient to create a risk of monopoly
is not mentioned in other rule of reason decisions. The "risk of monopoly" appears similar to the "dangerous probability of monopolization"
requirement for determining whether an attempt to monopolize violates section 2 because the potential monopolist might actually achieve
his goals. 70 In contrast, whether an act unreasonably restrains trade for
purposes of section I hinges on whether competition has been restricted
in the market.
Havoco is perhaps best viewed in relation to its peculiar facts. The
plaintiff, an independent marketer of coal, obtained a ten-year contract
68.
69.
70.
casting

See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
See 435 U.S. at 688-92.
See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, (1946); Syracuse BroadCorp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, (2d Cir. 1956). See also 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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to supply coal to TVA. R&F, a coal producer, induced Havoco to assign its TVA contract to it in exchange for a commission. R&F's parent, Seaway Coal, was subsequently acquired by Shell Oil and refused
to pay the agreed-upon commission to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a
complaint alleging fraud, deceit, unfair competition and tortious interference with contract. The complaint was later amended to allege only
a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act against Shell, charging that
it sought to eliminate Havoco as a marketer of oil and gas as well as
coal by taking its TVA contract. The Seventh Circuit held that taking a
single job or customer from the original supplier does not itself violate
section 1 because it is not the equivalent of a lessening of competition
in the market. 7' Indeed, in Havoco there were more competitors in the
market after the alleged acts than before. It is a basic truism that customers are won and lost in the marketplace.
Thus, the result in Havoco, when limited to its facts, is consistent
with the rule of reason. The Havoco panel's dicta, however, adds requirements to proof of antitrust injury which are unnecessary and indeed counterproductive to the analysis which the rule of reason is
supposed to engender.
CONCLUSION

The recent decisions of the Seventh Circuit in both supplier-dealer
relations and the rule of reason reflect a tension between pragmatic
business economics and a philosophic narrowing of antitrust remedies.
Neither viewpoint yet holds sway and clarification can only come from
future decisions.

71. 626 F.2d at 558.

